

245 blossoms of the tree are stripped away by these winds before
179 the fruit can mature.

178 Traditional values affect the Bedouins' perception of
517 their new life. Men are fond of gathering for their ritual
272 three cups of mint tea and recalling "the good old days." In
[829] those days, they say, men only had to ride, shoot, and drink
233 tea. In the past, there was a great deal of security in
178 owning animals which are not as dependent on the rains as
422 is agriculture. During a year of bad rains, a Bedouin could
233 always move his flock to Libya or to the Nile Valley: "When
731 we have a bad year, we take our animals to the grass of our
166 relatives. When they have a bad year, they come here." In
167 the drought year of 1960, 20,000 Egyptian Bedouins migrated
to Libya in search of pasturage. This caused an international
[648] conflict and King Idris of Libya, for a short time, closed the
border to Bedouins. The conflict was finally resolved, and
the Bedouins were given permission to use the pastures of
Cyrenaica. None of the Bedouins of al-Qasr were involved in
this movement.

233 The Bedouins who have settled in the 'izba sector of
al-Qasr also prefer to keep some sheep. The security which
they represent is worth the time and expense of maintaining
233 them and paying a shepherd to look after them. The Bedouins,
178 in the past, paid their shepherds one sheep for every ten
465 sheep that he tended. Payment was made twice a year. Today,

428 562 [422] inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tent, which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on for they belong to the head of the household, the shaib.

596 177 178 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the composition of the basic family structure. One informant, [124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a household composed of his grandfather, father, father's brothers and their families. Since that time, his father has built another house away from the family home; one uncle has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there; his youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home; and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a segmentary society, although as a traditional process, it represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures. In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market orientation increases brothers begin to economically differentiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual profits.

182 177 *613 433 434

423 long time ago. This seems to be supported by the evidence
*613 shown below, for often conflict over land and water rights is
182 represented by litigation between individuals and not groups.
[691]

I have arbitrarily assigned to the classification of
•422 property rights the rights over women. I have done this
562 because a man acquires such rights as a member of a lineage
*613 jural group and secures them with the backing of public opinion and the 'awaiyid. Also, though a man in al-Qasr does not "own" his wife, he does have the legal rights to certain things related to her: he has the right to her sexual favors, and the right to claim her offspring for his own lineage.

685 Settlement in cases dealing with the infringement of
695 property rights, if they do not lead to personal injury cases, will usually be concluded by arbitration or oath-taking, either of which brings the two parties into agreement.

691 Date: 1964. Case: Quarrel between Bait 'Umran and Bait Idris
685 of 'Ailit Ma'fas over the ownership of a well. The 'awaaqil
*613 sent for the two parties involved, and they met on Wednesday,
578 market day. And the 'awaaqil told the two parties: "This is
692 a shame ('aib), you must be friends because you are from the same tribe." The 'awaaqil knew "from past history and from truthful elders" that the well belonged to 'Ait Idris. The 'awaaqil made 'Ait 'Umran change their minds about their claim
[695] to the well. Before the litigation 'Ait 'Umran had insisted

554 tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between
57 the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the
556 picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

554 TABLE 6
556
571
•422 COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC
423 STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR[1]

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

554 One most important way of accruing "status honor"
571 in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict
627 situations. The role of the third party represents an effective
*613 and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the
[778] office of 'aqila. For instance, by mediating through the process of **nazaala**, the third party prevents feuds.

[114] [1]This data is both approximate and partial. Some data
[128] are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

husband or his father pays the woman's father the bridewealth, or mahr. In exchange for the mahr, the husband expects his father-in-law to outfit his daughter with such items as rugs, blankets, and a few other household items, like cooking pots, serving dishes, and a metal or wooden chest to keep her clothes in. These items become the private property of the wife, but the husband has the right to use them. In addition, the man expects to gain certain rights to the woman. The customary law of Awlad Ali gives the husband three basic rights over his wife: the right to her sexual services (including the right to bear him children); the right to her labor in domestic activities; and the right to her obedience. Of the three rights, the first is the most exclusive. Not only doesthe husband have a complete monopoly over his wife's present sexual services, but he also has the right, if the girl has never been married before, to be the first to use such services. If he discovers that she is not a virgin, he can send her back to her father and get back his mahr.

The other two rights are not as exclusive. The husband's right to his wife's domestic labor does not prevent her from occasionally helping out in her father's or brother's household, especially if they live nearby. Finally, the husband's right to be obeyed by his wife is always subordinated to that of her father, who retains the ultimate authority over his daughter.

If the woman is killed or injured, the husband is deprived of all or some of her services, depending on the seriousness and the permanence of the injury, and therefore is entitled to compensation. The right of avenging the woman's murder remains, however, that of her family, since she is still a member of that family.

such compensation. In forfeiting her rights of inheritance, a woman secures for herself and her children the continuous support of her kin-group and the protection of her rights. This support was denied in the few cases I was able to collect in which the woman demanded her share of inheritance. The following is one of these cases. The material presented is a summary of the life history of Fatma, who at the time of the study, was a shopkeeper managing the small general store she owned near the railroad station of Burg el-Arab, some fifty miles west of Alexandria. She also practiced healing and midwifery on a part-time basis.

Fatma was the only daughter with four sons of sheikh El-Asi, who at one time was the aqila of bait Hussein of the Sanagrah tribal segment in the area. He was also known as a mardi and was frequently sought in mediation of disputes. He was believed to have supernatural power which he used to cure people for a certain amount of money. During his lifetime, he had acquired a sizable sum of money which he invested in livestock. At the time of his death his herd, which numbered more than 900 sheep and goats, was considered the finest in the area. He had no barley lands because his camp was deep in the desert, but he had fine grazing land.

Throughout the area the four sons were known for being arrogant and irresponsible. Three of them were employed by one of the irrigation projects carried on by the government in the area as construction workers; the fourth looked after the herd of his father. All four were known as chasers of women, and they frequently went to Alexandria to visit prostitutes and drink liquor.

Fatma was first married when she was eighteen to a man from Alexandria who had opened a general store in the area where her father

5: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1967 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

121 613 682 674 829 604 kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the mother's brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive one. The mother's brother may well be the only person who can help in certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister's son is left in a dilemma. The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say,

121 613 604 [554] that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help from his mother's brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can 'call' on another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate's share of local water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to be made, the mother's brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father directly, but his mother's brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian, and in this role he controls the son's property; disputes frequently break out as a result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father's brother in hostilities—but his mother's brother can do so for him. Whenever men come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father's brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their mothers' brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from the mother's brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male heirs, his sister's son might inherit all his wealth.

[582] [584] [429] [422] [583]

121 613 606 Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come to his son-in-law's aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother's brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

121 613 The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important, that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.

Cases

593 613 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to 613 demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from 422 this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on 735 the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or [556] suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

613 Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions 421 of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws 428 specify that women are not legal heirs,[8] and that all male children are [562] equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that [593] wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occured while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter [584] to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one [593] action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand [584] her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

[797] [795] [671] [8] The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

6: Peters E-5 (1948-1950) 1965 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
Cyrenaica

her father takes, but in certain critical situations he can be relieved of choice if the interests of the group as a whole are at stake.

Political authority is the preserve of a corporation, and its exercise leads to invasion of a man's authority in the field of domestic relations. This does not mean, however, that discrete areas of authority do not remain with the father. In the tent his authority over his son is so overwhelming as to keep the son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a slave, and in daily life he has to behave as one. He must obey every command, for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support among his agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation. Retreat from his father is hardly an alternative, since, while his father is alive, he has no animals of his own, and to leave camp would only mean that he would have to move outside his group to seek employment elsewhere as a shepherd. If he did this he would forfeit status, and almost certainly cut himself off from property which would fall to him after his father's death. A man who "denies" his father looses too many privileges for the practice to become widespread.

Caught in this dilemma, a son's predicament is worsened by the fact that he cannot initiate marriage negotiations — to be able to do so requires some animals to offer a girl's father. Through his mother's brother he has the means of bringing pressure to bear on his father, but the latter can resist for years. Finally, a marriage is arranged for him. It is difficult to convey the yearning of young Bedouin for marriage. They discuss it among themselves *ad nauseam*. For the most part their talk is about the sexual aspect of marriage. Premarital sex relations are strictly controlled, and the movements of each young girl are carefully guarded because, if on the day of her marriage the tent shows that she is not a virgin, she not only brings disgrace to her family, but the marriage may be revoked and her worth as a bride for another man seriously diminished. Nevertheless premarital relations do occur, if not between youths and maidens to any extent, between young men and married women.

The question still remains: why is marriage the occasion of such ebullient celebration? The formal authority a father exercises over his son changes little on marriage. Economically the son is still harnessed to the father. The latter still shouts his orders at him, and obedience remains unaltered. Any sign of an independent view on a matter is met with a gruff rebuff. If the marriage turns out to be disagreeable to the father, he has the authority — if not always the power — to break it. Marriage does not mean a change in the general mode of behaviour between the two; the legal relations remain unaltered, albeit modified in practice, as the married son matures in age. But marriage does mean the acquisition of rights and status previously denied a son. Henceforward, he has a domain of his own. This is high drama, indeed, for although every effort is made to give substance to the expressed view that "nothing has happened," for the first time in his life the son has seized publicly, amid the jubilations of his fellows, a status which hitherto was the possession of the father.